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A PRESUMPTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL TIME LIMIT
FOR ADMINISTRATIVE OVERDETENTION OF
INMATES ENTITLED TO RELEASE
Patricia E. Simone*
The mood and temper of the public in regard to the treatment of
crime and criminals is one of the most unfailing tests of the civilisa-
tion of any country. A calm and dispassionate recognition of the
rights of the accused against the State, and even of convicted
criminals against the State, a constant heart-searching by all charged
with the duty of punishment .... and an unfaltering faith that there
is a treasure, if you can only find it, in the heart of every man-these
are the symbols which in the treatment of crime and criminals mark
and measure the stored-up strength of a nation, and are the sign
and proof of the living virtue in it.
-Winston Churchill'
INTRODUCTION
On April 6, 2004, police stopped fifty-seven-year-old David Kil-
gore for speeding and arrested him for driving with a suspended li-
cense. Three days later, a court in Fulton County, Georgia, found
Kilgore guilty as charged and ordered him released because of the
time he already had spent in jail. Officials at the county jail, however,
did not release Kilgore until April 15, 2004-six days after the judge
had declared him a free man. During that time, Kilgore went four
days without medication for high blood pressure, diabetes, and
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2006; B.A.,
Anthropology and Spanish, University of Notre Dame, 2001. Special thanks to
Professors Amy Barrett, A.J. Bellia, and Jimmy Gurul6 for their helpful comments and
suggestions. Thank you to all the members of the Notre Dame Law Review for their
assistance in preparing this Note for publication. I also want to express my heartfelt
gratitude to my parents, my sisters, and my brother for their continual support and
encouragement.
I Winston S. Churchill, Address to the House of Commons (July 20, 1910), in 2
WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: His COMPLETE SPEECHES, 1897-1963, at 1589, 1598 (Robert
Rhodes James ed., 1974).
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seizures. He suffered three seizures, fainted twice, and was rushed to
the hospital once. 2
On September 20, 2002, authorities arrested Hiram Fuentes for
domestic battery. Three weeks later, a circuit court in Cook County,
Illinois, dismissed the charges. Instead of being released, however,
Fuentes says he was held by the Cook County Department of Correc-
tions for five more days and then inexplicably transferred into the cus-
tody of the Illinois Department of Corrections. On December 10,
2002, two months after a judge ordered his release, the state correc-
tions department finally freed Fuentes after receiving documents con-
firming that the charges against him had been dropped.3
These incidents are not unique to Atlanta or Chicago. Similar
tales of overdetention come out of facilities on both the East and West
Coasts. In 2003, the U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C., certified
a class of inmates kept in custody beyond their release dates as plain-
tiffs in a class action suit against the District of Columbia. 4 In 2001,
Los Angeles County settled five class action suits brought on behalf of
inmates also held beyond their release dates.5 In the end, the county
agreed to pay $27 million to a class of approximately 400,000 people
detained in Los Angeles jails over a five-year period.6
Whether acquitted, the charges dismissed, or a full sentence
served, a person whose legal basis for detention has ended is not
"free" until jailers actually effectuate his or her release. Bureaucratic
delays often keep people in jail anywhere from a few hours to a few
days beyond their scheduled release. 7 With the cost of housing in-
mates in our nation's prisons and jails reaching astronomical figures, 8
2 Rhonda Cook, Fulton Jailers Accused of Holding Inmates Too Long, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., Jan. 28, 2005, at Al.
3 James G. Sotos, Holding Pattern: Detainee States Claim, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., July
22, 2004, at 6.
4 Bynum v. District of Columbia, 214 F.R.D. 27, 42 (D.D.C. 2003).
5 Steven H. Pollak, Georgia County Faces Class Action over Jail Procedures, RECORDER
(S.F.), Apr. 30, 2004, at 3.
6 Id.
7 For example, out-processing for released inmates in Los Angeles County regu-
larly lasts one to two days. See Streit v. County of L.A., 236 F.3d 552, 556 (9th Cir.
2001). In the past two years, there have been reports of correctional facilities across
the United States holding inmates after they were entitled to release. See, e.g., Cook,
supra note 2; Matt Krasnowski, Court Reinstates Lawsuit that Claims County Unduly Delays
Release of Inmates, DAILY BREEZE (Torrance, Cal.), Aug. 14, 2004, at A4; Rob Olmstead,
Jailed in Red Tape: Cook County Jail Won't Let Go of Inmates-Even when It Should, Several
Prisoners Contend, DAILY HERALD (Arlington Heights, Ill.), Sept. 9, 2004, at 1; Pollak,
supra note 5; Sotos, supra note 3.
8 The average annual operating cost per state inmate in 2001 was $22,650, or
$62.05 per day. JAMES J. STEPHAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: STATE
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it is surprising that facility administrators would detain inmates any
longer than necessary. Economics aside, overdetention implicates
fundamental liberty interests protected by the U.S. Constitution,9 as
well as serious secondary side effects like loss of employment, lost busi-
ness opportunities, strain on family relationships, and exposure to in-
adequate health care and violent assault.1 0
The current legal standard governing administrative overdeten-
tion is vague at best. Officials have a "reasonable time" to complete
administrative tasks necessary to effectuate an inmate's release, 1' but
there is no consensus among the circuits as to what amount of time is
reasonable' 2 or even which tasks are properly considered "administra-
tive."'13 In order to provide proper guidance for corrections facility
administrators and policymakers, a clear legal standard is essential. A
twenty-four-hour presumptive constitutional time limit would offer ad-
equate guidance for government officials while balancing individual
liberty interests with public safety concerns.
This Note analyzes the phenomenon of overdetention due to ad-
ministrative delays. Part I defines the problem of administrative
overdetention, looks at its causes, and describes its consequences.
Part II compares the current state of the law in the area of overdeten-
tion to the legal climate relating to probable cause determinations
before the Supreme Court decided County of Riverside v. McLaughlin.1 4
Finally, Part III proposes a twenty-four-hour presumptive constitu-
tional time limit for administrative overdetention and analyzes the
costs and benefits of this burden-shifting framework.
PRISON EXPENDITURES, 2001, at 1 (2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
pub/pdf/spe01.pdf. Among facilities operated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the
average annual operating cost was $22,632 per inmate, or $62.01 per day. Id.
9 See infra Part I.A.
10 See infra Part I.B.
11 Lewis v. O'Grady, 853 F.2d 1366, 1370 (7th Cir. 1988).
12 Berry v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764, 771 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Courts have not settled on
any concrete number of permissible hours of delay in the context of post-release de-
tentions."). Compare Brass v. County of L.A., 328 F.3d 1192, 1202 (9th Cir. 2003)
("One might conclude that when a court orders a prisoner released-or when, for
example, a prisoner's sentence has been completed-the outer bounds for releasing
the prisoner should be less than 48 hours."), with Lewis, 853 F.2d at 1370 ("It is virtu-
ally impossible to establish an absolute minimum time to meet all potential circum-
stances which might exist.").
13 See infra note 66 and accompanying text (describing the inconsistency among
some federal courts about which tasks are labeled "administrative").
14 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
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I. OVERDETENTION: "A CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUE FROM HELL"' 5
A. Defining the Problem
Freedom from physical detention by one's government is the
most elemental liberty interest.16 As such, "[fireedom from bodily re-
straint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause."'17 Consequently, when the basis for a person's deten-
tion has ended, that person is entitled to release.' 8 If jail or prison
officials continue to hold someone in custody without a valid court
order, they could deprive that person of liberty without due process of
law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 9 Subjecting a pris-
oner to detention beyond the termination of his or her sentence with-
out penological justification has also been held to violate the Eighth
Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.20
15 Alan Powell, who was not released from Fulton County Jail until three days
after his bond was paid because there was no record of him having been booked into
the jail, said: "'It's a civil rights issue from hell .... If a judge says I'm free, I'm
supposed to go free.'" Cook, supra note 2.
16 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (plurality opinion).
17 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457
U.S. 307, 316 (1982)).
18 Cannon v. Macon County, I F.3d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir. 1993) (finding a recog-
nized constitutional right to be free from continued detention after it was or should
have been known that the detainee was entitled to release), modified, 15 F.3d 1022
(IIth Cir. 1994); Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 791 (5th Cir. 1969) ("There is no privi-
lege in a jailer to keep a prisoner in jail beyond the period of his lawful sentence.");
McCurry v. Moore, 242 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1178 (N.D. Fla. 2002) ("The underlying
constitutional right is well established. When a prisoner's sentence has expired, he is
entitled to release.").
19 See Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527, 532 (5th Cir. 1980) ("Detention of a pris-
oner thirty days beyond the expiration of his sentence in the absence of a facially valid
court order or warrant constitutes a deprivation of due process."). This Note focuses
on the Fourteenth Amendment because the problem of overdetention seems to be
unique to county correctional facilities and local jails located in or near large metro-
politan areas-e.g., Atlanta, Chicago, D.C., and Los Angeles. See sources cited supra
note 7. It logically follows that overdetention by federal officials could violate the
Fifth Amendment. No instances of overdetention in federal prisons have been re-
ported, however.
20 Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 686 (3d Cir. 1993); Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d
1099, 1107-08 (3d Cir. 1989); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir.
1985) (en banc) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-40 (1979)). There is some
debate as to whether the constitutional right not to be imprisoned beyond a man-
dated release date is rooted in due process or the Eighth Amendment. As several
courts have noted, however, the threshold for liability is the same. See McCuny, 242 F.
Supp. 2d at 1178-79 (noting the confusion and distinguishing claims in ajail setting
versus claims brought by sentenced prisoners); Allen v. Guerrero, 688 N.W.2d 673,
680 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (acknowledging the debate stating: "The proper question is
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The courts have recognized correctly that unreasonable overdeten-
tion violates fundamental personal liberty interests because "[n] ext to
bodily security, freedom of choice and movement has the highest
place in the spectrum of values recognized by our Constitution. 21
So why are people who have been declared judicially "free" stay-
ing behind bars? The attorney for the former Sheriff of Fulton
County, Georgia, said that no one intended to hold inmates longer
than necessary and any delays were the consequence of having too few
resources to process inmates into and out of the jail.22 A Fulton
County Superior Court Judge also pointed out several reasons for the
delayed releases-an increase in the number of people passing
through the jail, a tightening of the procedures for out-processing in-
mates due to prior accidental releases, and poor communication
systems. 23
1. Poor Communication Systems
As of 2004, the jail and the courts in Fulton County transmitted
data back and forth via e-mail and then manually entered information
into the respective agencies' computer systems. 2 4 The sheriffs depart-
ment admitted that "the release backlog [wa]s ... exacerbated by a
'sluggish and outdated computer system.'" 25 According to the attor-
ney for the former Sheriff of Fulton County, "'Because of the lack of
funding, the department did the best it could."' 26
These "administrative glitches and bad practices" are not unique
to Fulton County.2 7 In Washington, D.C., the courts and the jail also
use separate computer systems. 28 Therefore, upon returning from the
,not whether the defendants could have cited the exact article, section, and clause of
the Constitution that they were offending. It is instead the more practical question of
whether they would have understood that what they were doing violated the plaintiffs
rights.'" (quoting Markham v. White, 172 F.3d 486, 492 (7th Cir. 1999))).
21 Sample, 885 F.2d at 1109.
22 Cook, supra note 2.
23 Pollak, supra note 5. Admissions to the Fulton County Jail increased by twenty-
nine percent between 2003 and 2004. Steven H. Pollak, Legal Woes Mountingfor Fulton
Jail, DAILY REP. (Fulton County, Ga.), May 17, 2004, at 1. This translates into an in-
crease in the average number of releases per day. As of May 2004, jail workers were
releasing an average of 112 inmates per day. Id. In 2002, the average number of
releases per day was eighty. Pollak, supra note 5.
24 Pollak, supra note 5.
25 Pollak, supra note 23.
26 Cook, supra note 2.
27 Pollak, supra note 5 (quoting an attorney representing overdetained plaintiffs
from both Fulton County and D.C.).
28 Id.
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courthouse, an inmate's data has to be entered manually into the jail's
computer system-that is, assuming the inmate returns with
paperwork.29
2. Post-Release Checks for Wants and Holds
In addition to communication backlogs, post-release checks for
wants and holds also result in delays. For example, the D.C. Depart-
ment of Corrections has a policy of checking for outstanding warrants
after a judge orders an inmate's release, prolonging an inmate's de-
tention further.30 The Los Angeles Sheriffs Department (LASD) also
has a policy of delaying inmate releases until checks for outstanding
warrants are completed:
Before an inmate is released from prison, the LASD conducts a
check of the Automated Justice Information System ("AJIS"), a com-
puterized law enforcement database, to confirm that the prisoner is
not wanted by any other law enforcement agency. It is the LASD's
policy, however, to run the AJIS check only after all wants and holds
that arrive on the day a prisoner is scheduled for release are input-
ted into the database. Due to the high volume of wants and holds
received each day, the inputting process can, and often does, take
between one to two days to complete. It is only after the inputting
process is complete and the computer check run, that the LASD
begins the administrative steps toward a prisoner's release. Al-
though no longer required to serve time, these prisoners must re-
main in jail during the inputting period, extending their
incarceration beyond their release date.3 '
This check is "both time consuming and laborious" due to the fact
that "there [a]re several information sources to investigate and the
Sheriff's Department [i]s not endowed with an efficient or very effec-
tive computer system." 32
A spokesperson for the Cook County Sheriff admitted that logisti-
cal considerations delay the release of inmates in Chicago as well.3 3 In
line with policies in D.C. and Los Angeles, he noted that certain pro-
cedures must be followed so an inmate wanted on another charge or
case is not accidentally released 34:
29 Id. (noting that "the paperwork in Washington did not always come back from
the courthouse with the inmate").
30 Id.
31 Streit v. County of L.A., 236 F.3d 552, 556 (9th Cir. 2001).
32 Fowler v. Block, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1277 (C.D. Cal. 1998), rev'd on other
grounds, 185 F.3d 866 (9th Cir. 1999).
33 Olmstead, supra note 7.
34 Id.
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If a defendant is released by a judge in [another] court-
house, . . . he must wait for the bus back to Cook County jail.
There, he and about 250 other released inmates must have their
paperwork reviewed. Then, a computer check must be run to make
sure there are no other court cases pending or that no other juris-
dictions have added a warrant for the inmate since he was admitted.
Each defendant's index fingerprint is taken, and it must match
the print they gave when they entered the jail. Comparing prints
also takes time.
3 5
Cook County jail officials said that, "given the massive number of in-
mates they deal with daily, the system in place is the only realistic way
to manage inmates."
3 6
Whether or not the policies and procedures in Atlanta, D.C., Los
Angeles, and Chicago are the most efficient, the delays in release do
not seem ill intentioned.3 7 Jail officials cite the need to protect the
community from accidental releases as one of the main reasons un-
derlying their policies. 38 Due to a general lack of resources and man-
power, 39 however, persons entitled to their freedom are being kept in
jail after a judge has ordered their release from custody.
B. Consequences of Overdetention
No matter what good intentions lie behind delays in releasing in-
mates, overdetention results in serious tangible consequences. Pro-
longed detention "may imperil [one]'s job, interrupt [one']s source
of income, and impair [one']s family relationships." 40 The negative
side effects of overdetention are real and felt by more than just the
person who remains in custody.
35 Id.
36 Id.; see also Wright v. Sheahan, No. 96 C 6737, 1997 WL 89135, at *3 n.4 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 26, 1997) (noting that "tens of thousands of people (approximately 87,000 in
1995) are processed through the Cook County Jail each year"). The former Cook
County Sheriff said that it "'takes some time to sort out' the approximate 600-800
prisoners who are returned from court each day." Lewis v. O'Grady, 853 F.2d 1366,
1370 (7th Cir. 1988).
37 See supra text accompanying note 22.
38 See supra text accompanying note 34.
39 See supra text accompanying note 26 (discussing the lack of funding). The
attorney for the former Sheriff of Fulton County also said that "[a] lack of staffing
made the problem worse." Cook, supra note 2.
40 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (discussing pretrial detention).
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1. Economic Interests
Overdetention can severely affect individual economic interests.
For instance, Dwight Mallory's wrecker service almost went under af-
ter his four-day overdetention in Fulton County Jail.41 Jail officials
told Mallory that his release was delayed due to an inmate processing
backlog. The one-time Coast Guardsman and former Air Force Re-
servist said, "'I've seen military prisoners treated a lot better.' ",42 Mal-
lory lost thirty-one of the forty-four clients that regularly used his
towing service when they could not reach him for several days.
43
For those who have not been convicted of any crime, overdeten-
tion not only affects one's earning capacity, but one's reputation in
the community and familial responsibilities.
The agonies associated with prolonged.., detention are visited
upon the families of those detained and eventually will be felt by the
entire society. Extended . . . confinement is likely to destroy
whatever family unit existed prior to the defendant's arrest. If the
defendant was previously employed, it is almost certain that his pay
will stop and that he will not have a job to return to. If his family is
affected in no other way, they will suffer at least from the loss of
income during this period. They are likely to be forced to seek pub-
lic assistance and to become added statistics on the welfare rolls.
The response of moralists that the defendant should have consid-
ered the cost to his family before he got himself into trouble is irrel-
evant to this consideration, because . . . defendants who have yet to
be convicted of a crime . . .are still presumed innocent.
44
The phrase "innocent until proven guilty" does not always reflect the
thinking of society when it comes to people who have been arrested.
After all, if a person does not deserve to be in jail, it is logical to think
that the authorities should immediately let that person go. As the
news reports indicate,45 however, immediate release is usually not the
case.
41 A customs officer stopped Mallory at the Atlanta airport upon his return from
visiting relatives in South America. A computer error mistakenly showed that Mallory
owed $7,000 in child support payments, when in fact the payments had been automat-
ically deducted from his paychecks. Despite Mallory's explanations, he was arrested
and incarcerated. The following day, ajudge ordered Mallory's release after the pri-
vate company responsible for collecting the payments confirmed the mistake. Mal-
lory sat in jail for four more days, however. Cook, supra note 2.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 LEWIS KATZ ET AL., JUSTICE Is THE CRIME: PRETRIAL DELAY IN FELONY CASES
59-60 (1972).
45 See supra note 7.
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2. Personal Safety
Overdetention can also have serious personal safety conse-
quences. Consider the situation of David Kilgore, with whom this dis-
cussion began. 46  Because of his medical condition, his six-day
overdetention could have cost him his life. In response to the ordeal,
Kilgore stated that he had "'never been through anything like
that.' "47
An overlooked medical condition is only one personal safety issue
implicated by overdetention. The disturbing story of Herman Mc-
Murry illustrates further dangers of overdetention in graphic detail.4
"While in the sheriffs custody, [McMurry], who was guilty of nothing
and never even charged with a crime, was placed in the general prison
population at Cook County Jail, where he was raped and sexually as-
saulted by other unknown inmates. '49 McMurry's overdetention
lasted between ten and eleven hours, but the trauma he endured will
likely stay with him forever.
Part I established that overdetention implicates fundamental lib-
erty interests, as well as produces negative side effects of economic
loss, family strain, damaged reputation, and personal safety concerns.
Part I also explored the various reasons behind repeated overdeten-
tions, which can be summarized as a lack of financial resources, un-
derstaffing, and inefficient administrative practices. In Part II, the
discussion turns to an explanation of how the current legal standard
46 See supra text accompanying note 2.
47 Cook, supra note 2.
48 On July 1, 1994, a Chicago police officer stopped McMurry for a routine traffic
violation. Following procedure, the officer ran a check on his computer system and
came across an outstanding warrant in McMurry's name. What was not indicated in
the system was that McMurry had already appeared in court and the warrant had been
quashed. Despite McMurry's protests that the computer system was incorrect, the
police officer arrested and incarcerated him. After spending the weekend in jail, Mc-
Murry finally appeared before a judge on July 5, 1994. The judge then determined
that the warrant had in fact been quashed. Consequently, the judge ordered Mc-
Murry's release. But officials did not release McMurry immediately, and instead trans-
ported him back to Cook CountyJail to await processing. McMurry v. Sheahan, 927 F.
Supp. 1082, 1086-87 (N.D. I1. 1996).
The Illinois statewide law enforcement computer network, known by the acro-
nym LEADS, has been the subject of other lawsuits. See Ruehman v. Village of Palos
Park, No. 91 C 8355, 1992 WL 170565 (N.D. Ill. July 16, 1992) (mem.). In Ruehman,
the plaintiffs alleged that they were named in arrest warrants that had been quashed
or recalled but not removed from municipal and state computer data banks. Id. at *1.
Some were arrested and detained on the quashed or invalid warrants because the
arrest warrants continued to be listed in the LEADS system as valid. Id.
49 McMurry, 927 F. Supp. at 1087.
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governing administrative overdetention creates confusion and has the
potential to stall systemic reforms.
II. WHAT IS A "REASONABLE" AMOUNT OF TIME WHEN You ARE IN
JAIL FOR No REASON?
As a result of various administrative details, officials may not be
able to free a prisoner or detainee the instant custodial authority ex-
pires. Consequently, jail and prison officials are granted a "reasona-
ble time" for tasks such as processing, transportation, and identity
verification. 50 This reasonableness standard stems from the "wide-
ranging deference" accorded to administrators in dealing with the
"day-to-day operation of a corrections facility."51
Prison administrators are expected to exercise their professional
judgment "in the adoption and execution of policies and practices
that.., are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to
maintain institutional security. ' 52 Courts have held that the policies
and procedures governing the release of inmates fall "within the
scope of maintaining institutional security."53 For this reason, sheriffs
and other prison administrators are "generally free to exercise discre-
tion in processing prisoners for release [and] judges do not normally
direct [administrators] when and where to effectuate release."54 With
this discretion, the critical issue becomes the amount of time that can
be considered a constitutionally reasonable administrative delay in the
release of inmates whose basis for detention has expired.
A. The McLaughlin Comparison
The legal climate with regard to administrative delays in the re-
lease of prisoners mirrors the uncertainty that surrounded administra-
tive delays for pretrial detention probable cause hearings before the
50 Lewis v. O'Grady, 853 F.2d 1366, 1370 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Brass v. County
of L.A., 328 F.3d 1192, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that the plaintiff "may have had a
due process right to be released within a reasonable time after the reason for his
detention ended"); Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 792 (5th Cir. 1969) (explaining that a
jailer's duty to effect a prisoner's timely release "is not breached until the expiration
of a reasonable time").
51 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979).
52 Id.
53 Wright v. Sheahan, No. 96 C 6737, 1997 WL 89135, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26,
1997) (citing Lewis, 853 F.2d at 1369).
54 Thompson v. Sheahan, No. 00 C 3772, 2001 WL 204774, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1,
2001) (citing Lewis, 853 F.2d at 1369); see also Brass, 328 F.3d at 1200 ("The order in
which the Sheriffs Department handles prisoner releases is an administrative matter
primarily within the Department's discretion.").
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Supreme Court decided County of Riverside v. McLaughlin.55 To under-
stand this comparison, one must first understand the legal context of
the McLaughlin decision.
In Gerstein v. Pugh,56 the Supreme Court held that "the Fourth
Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a
prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest."5 7 The
Court further held that "this determination must be made by a judi-
cial officer either before or promptly after arrest.' 58 Under Gerstein, if a
criminal suspect is arrested without a warrant, only "a brief period of
detention to take the administrative steps incident to arrest" may pre-
cede a probable cause hearing.59
The Gerstein Court did not articulate a specific time period within
which a probable cause hearing must occur. It simply stated that the
judicial determination should follow "promptly after arrest."60 The
Court allowed for flexibility in combining probable cause hearings
with other pretrial proceedings, concluding that there was "no single
preferred pretrial procedure."61 This flexibility led to confusion as
lower courts struggled to interpret the meaning of Gerstein's "prompt"
standard.
1. Confusion Post- Gerstein
The courts developed varying interpretations of the Gerstein stan-
dard. For some "prompt" meant immediately after the administrative
steps incident to arrest had been completed. 62 For others it meant
any time within seventy-two hours. 63
55 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
56 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
57 Id. at 114.
58 Id. at 125 (emphasis added). This decision spawned the now common Gerstein
probable cause hearing that follows a warrantless arrest. See Preliminary Proceedings, 33
GEO. L.J. ANN. REv. CRIM. PROC. 193, 206-08 (2004).
59 420 U.S. at 114.
60 Id. at 125.
61 Id. at 123.
62 See, e.g., Mabry v. County of Kalamazoo, 626 F. Supp. 912, 914 (W.D. Mich.
1986) (finding that warrantless detention beyond time needed to take administrative
steps incident to arrest violates arrestee's constitutional rights); Lively v. Cullinane,
451 F. Supp. 1000, 1004 (D.D.C. 1978) (holding that the state may delay probable
cause determination only for the time reasonably necessary for police to process
arrestee).
63 For example, in Bernard v. City of Palo Alto, 699 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. 1983), the
Ninth Circuit held that, considering no more than ten hours was necessary to com-
plete the administrative steps incident to arrest, twenty-four hours was the maximum
length of detention permissible without a probable cause determination. Id. at 1025.
2006]
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The current "reasonable time" standard for the release of in-
mates parallels the Gerstein "promptness" standard regarding post-ar-
rest probable cause determinations. The Supreme Court has never
addressed the specific issue of a constitutional time limit for the re-
lease of inmates whose legal justification for detention has expired,
and even with an examination of lower court decisions, there is no
clear answer as to what amount of time is a constitutionally reasonable
administrative delay in releasing inmates. 64 Similarly, the Gerstein
In contrast with Bernards twenty-four-hour time limit, in Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d
374 (2d Cir. 1988), the Second Circuit approved an arraignment system with a sev-
enty-two-hour outer limit between a warrantless arrest and a probable cause determi-
nation. Id. at 387. The Williams court believed Gerstein allowed for experimentation
with criminal pretrial procedures. Id. at 386. Because criminal suspects were af-
forded the right to counsel and to make a personal appearance, the court held that
the procedural benefits provided by New York City's arraignment system constitution-
ally justified detention periods of up to seventy-two hours. Id. at 387.
Other post-Gerstein opinions concerning the reasonableness of delay between a
warrantless arrest and a judicial probable cause determination include Llaguno v.
Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1568 (7th Cir. 1985) (forty-two hour detention without proba-
ble cause hearing found unreasonable under the circumstances), and Fisher v. Wash-
ington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 690 F.2d 1133, 1140 (4th Cir. 1982)
(reasonableness of post-arrest detention preceding determination of probable cause
by a judicial officer will vary with geographical factors and factual exigencies on a
case-by-case basis).
64 Courts usually examine the specific circumstances under which the plaintiff's
release was delayed in order to determine if there was any constitutional violation.
Only two reported cases have held that overdetentions of a particular length of time
are unreasonable as a matter of law. See Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527, 532 (5th Cir.
1980) ("Detention of a prisoner thirty days beyond the expiration of his sentence in
the absence of a facially valid court order or warrant constitutes a deprivation of due
process."); Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 792 (5th Cir. 1969) ("It may safely be said that
Kern's ignorance for nine long months after the termination of all proceedings
against Whirl was, as a matter of law, ignorance for an unreasonable time."). These
cases are extreme-thirty days in one and nine months in the other-making it
nearly impossible to argue that the delays in release were reasonable. Things become
muddled, however, when the overdetention is shorter.
Most cases discussing overdetention assert that what is a "reasonable time" for
out-processing "is a question best left open for juries to answer based on the facts
presented in each case." Lewis v. O'Grady, 853 F.2d 1366, 1370 (7th Cir. 1988); see
also Berry v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764, 771 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that what length of
time is a reasonable delay "is a factual determination that is appropriately left to the
jury to decide"); Green v. Baca, 306 F. Supp. 2d 903, 918 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (refusing to
adopt a per se rule that a 12.5-hour delay was reasonable as a matter of law and stating
instead that "the court must... look to the circumstances of the case" (citing Brass v.
County of L.A., 328 F.3d 1192, 1202 (9th Cir. 2003))).
Operating under this theory, courts have declined to comment on the reasona-
bleness of overdetentions ranging from fifty minutes to twenty-nine hours. See Beny,
379 F.3d at 773 (reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment for defend-
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Court did not define a specific time limit for post-arrest probable
cause hearings. The only gauge under Gerstein was "a brief period...
to take the administrative steps incident to arrest. '65 Furthermore,
the Gerstein Court did not articulate what exactly comprised "adminis-
trative steps incident to arrest," leading to varying interpretations of
the Gerstein standard in the lower courts. Similarly, courts today strug-
gle with deciding which administrative tasks are necessary to effectu-
ate a prisoner's release. 66
Uncertainty surrounding Gerstein's promptness standard per-
sisted until 1991 when the Supreme Court clarified the outer limits of
a permissible administrative delay between a warrantless arrest and a
probable cause determination in its McLaughlin decision. 67 In Mc-
Laughlin, the Court noted the lack of a clear constitutional standard
under Gerstein:
Unfortunately, as lower court decisions applying Gerstein have
demonstrated, it is not enough to say that probable cause determi-
nations must be "prompt." This vague standard simply has not pro-
vided sufficient guidance. Instead, it has led to a flurry of systemic
challenges to city and county practices, putting federal judges in the
role of making legislative judgments and overseeing local jailhouse
operations. 68
The same can be said of the "reasonable time" standard for
overdetention. This vague standard has proved ineffective in aiding
jail officials to establish clearly constitutional policies. As a result, in-
mates continue to challenge policies which lead to overdetention, and
ants on twenty-six- to twenty-nine-hour overdetentions and stating "[w]e find that this
question of reasonableness is properly conceived of as a jury determination"); Lewis,
853 F.2d at 1372 (reversing the district court's directed verdict for defendants on an
eleven-hour overdetention and concluding "based on the facts in this case, it is a
question for the jury to determine whether the time involved in processing the release
of Sandy Lewis was reasonable"); Green, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 919 (denying defendant's
motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs claim of excessive detention in violation
of Fourteenth Amendment for a 12.5-hour overdetention); Muick v. Jasso, No. 3:02-
CV-1089-L, 2003 WL 22054226, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 2003) (labeling plaintiffs
claim for fifty-minute overdetention as nonfrivolous).
65 420 U.S. at 114.
66 For example, the district court in Fowler v. Block, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (C.D. Cal.
1998), rev'd on other grounds, 185 F.3d 866 (9th Cir. 1999), distinguished administrative
activities incident to discharge, such as returning personal belongings and processing
paperwork, from checks for wants and holds. Id. at 1277. Other courts analyzing out-
processing procedures in Los Angeles county jails have not differentiated these tasks.
See, e.g., Berry, 379 F.3d 764; Brass, 328 F.3d 1192; Streit v. County of L.A., 236 F.3d
552 (9th Cir. 2001).
67 County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
68 Id. at 55-56.
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federaljudges are left to examine the reasonableness of those policies.
Most of the time, however, these reasonableness determinations are
left for juries because "reasonableness" is an inherently fact-specific
inquiry. As the case law demonstrates, 69 it is difficult to glean a clear
standard for evaluating what is a "reasonable" amount of time from
jury verdicts based on particularized fact patterns. As a result of in-
consistent interpretations of the Gerstein standard, the McLaughlin
Court felt that it was "important to provide some degree of certainty
so that States and counties may establish procedures with confidence
that they fall within constitutional bounds."70 Likewise, it is impera-
tive that prison officials and policymakers have guidance to evaluate
the constitutionality of their procedures for processing releases.
2. McLaughlin's Presumptive Constitutional Time Limit
In response to the climate of uncertainty following Gerstein, the
McLaughlin Court established a presumptive constitutional time limit
for post-arrest probable cause hearings. 71 The Court recognized that
some administrative delays caused by paperwork and logistical
problems are "inevitable. '72 Consequently, the Court determined that
"the Fourth Amendment permits a reasonable postponement of a
probable cause determination while the police cope with the everyday
problems of processing suspects through an overly burdened criminal
justice system." 73 After balancing competing interests, the Court con-
cluded that "a jurisdiction that provides judicial determination of
probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, com-
ply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein.''74
The McLaughlin forty-eight-hour framework is best understood as
a burden-shifting scheme. Jurisdictions that allow for a probable
cause determination within forty-eight hours of a warrantless arrest
are immune from systemic challenges. 75 The Court explained that
when an arrestee does not receive a probable cause determination
within forty-eight hours, however, the burden of proof shifts to the
government to demonstrate the existence of an emergency or other
extraordinary circumstance justifying the delay.76 The Court also took
69 See supra note 64.
70 500 U.S. at 56.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 55.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 56.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 57. The McLaughlin Court plainly stated that normal procedural consid-
erations do not qualify as extraordinary circumstances. Id. ("The fact that in a partic-
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care to clarify that a probable cause determination in a particular case
does not pass "constitutional muster simply because it is provided
within 48 hours. Such a hearing may nonetheless violate Gerstein if
the arrested individual can prove that his or her probable cause deter-
mination was delayed unreasonably."7
7
The McLaughlin burden-shifting framework follows logically from
the "practical compromise" struck in Gerstein.7 8 Gerstein properly bal-
anced the interests of public safety and the harm to a potentially inno-
cent person by holding that the Fourth Amendment requires a
judicial determination of probable cause promptly after a warrantless
arrest.
79
On the one hand, States have a strong interest in protecting public
safety by taking into custody those persons who are reasonably sus-
pected of having engaged in criminal activity, even where there has
been no opportunity for a prior judicial determination of probable
cause. On the other hand, prolonged detention based on incorrect
or unfounded suspicion may unjustly "imperil [a] suspect's job, in-
terrupt his source of income, and impair his family relationships." 80
A prompt probable cause determination following a brief period
of time for administrative tasks incident to arrest adequately protects
the public and the individual. Gerstein's flexible standard also respects
federalism concerns by giving deference to the states to experiment
with different combinations of pretrial procedures.8 ' But, as the Mc-
Laughlin Court emphasized, "flexibility has its limits. '8 2 In the end,
the Fourth Amendment is meant to protect individual rights. There-
fore, a presumptive constitutional time limit is necessary to give gui-
dance to policymaking officials.8 3
Similar interests are at stake in cases of administrative overdeten-
tion. 84 While it is obviously necessary to protect the community from
ular case it may take longer than 48 hours to consolidate pretrial proceedings does
not qualify as an extraordinary circumstance.").
77 Id. at 56. "Examples of unreasonable delay are delays for the purpose of gath-
ering additional evidence to justify the arrest, a delay motivated by ill will against the
arrested individual, or delay for delay's sake." Id.
78 See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113-14 (1975).
79 See id.
80 McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 52 (quoting Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 112, 114) (alteration
in original) (citations omitted).
81 Id. at 53.
82 Id. at 55.
83 Id. at 56.
84 The following discussion analogizes the Gerstein-McLaughlin analysis to cases of
administrative overdetention. While it is true that Gerstein and McLaughlin are Fourth
Amendment cases and most overdetention cases are analyzed under the Fourteenth
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accidental releases, out-processing procedures that result in several
days of overdetention conflict with the fundamental liberty interest in
being free from undue restraint and may unjustly "imperil [one]'s
job, interrupt [one']s source of income, and impair [one']s family re-
lationships."8 5 Principles of federalism counsel against direct interfer-
ence with local control over release procedures. "But flexibility has its
limits "8.... 86 Just as "Gerstein [wa] s not a blank check" for states to
detain individuals who have been arrested without probable cause for
extended periods of time,8 7 the current legal standard governing re-
lease procedures does not sanction policies that regularly result in the
overdetention of persons entitled to their freedom. Local policymak-
ers need a legal standard that provides guidance while taking into ac-
count practical considerations of jail administration.
The McLaughlin analysis of the practical realities of an overly bur-
dened criminal justice system informed the Court's choice of a bright-
line rule for post-arrest probable cause determinations.8 8 This analy-
Amendment, the pretrial/post-release comparison is nevertheless a valid one. First,
the seminal case in the area of overdetention, Lewis v. O'Grady, 853 F.2d 1366, 1372
(7th Cir. 1988), analyzed the reasonableness of the plaintiffs overdetention under
the Fourth Amendment. Second, even if post-release overdetentions are examined
under the Fourteenth Amendment, the procedural due process analysis articulated in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), is essentially a balancing test which
comports in material respects with the weighing of interests discussed in McLaughlin.
To make the analogy more explicit, let us consider the three-factor Mathews test.
The first factor is "the private interest that will be affected by the official action." Id.
The second factor is "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute proce-
dural safeguards." Id. The third factor in the Mathews analysis is "the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Id. While the
McLaughlin analysis is fundamentally a reasonableness inquiry, one would evaluate
whether an administrative detention is "reasonable" by considering the same kinds of
factors that Mathews proposes. In other words, to decide whether an administrative
detention was "reasonable," one would consider the private interest, the public inter-
est, and the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty. In the case of administrative
overdetention, the reasonableness inquiry and the Mathews inquiry are one and the
same. Finally, the pretrial/post-release comparison is legitimate because of the simi-
lar individual liberty interests at stake and the comparable government burdens in
both contexts.
85 See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114; see also supra Part I.B.
86 See McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 55.
87 Id.
88 See supra text accompanying note 73.
Courts cannot ignore the often unavoidable delays in transporting arrested
persons from one facility to another, handling late-night bookings where no
magistrate is readily available, obtaining the presence of an arresting officer
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sis is particularly relevant to similar administrative delays which result
from the out-processing of large numbers of inmates passing through
a detention center.
In Brass v. County of Los Angeles,89 the Ninth Circuit compared the
administrative delays for post-arrest probable cause hearings discussed
in McLaughlin to processing delays which result in overdetention of
inmates scheduled for release. 90 The plaintiff in Brass, who was re-
leased thirty-nine hours after his release order was entered, alleged
that his overdetention was due to the administrative practice of the
county to wait to process a particular day's releases until it received all
information relating to the prisoners scheduled for release on that
day, including wants and holds.9' "In dismissing the case, the district
court relied significantly on the fact that the 39-hour delay.., was less
than the 48-hour delay that the Supreme Court had sanctioned in
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin."92 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision, concluding that the plaintiff did not have a
constitutional right to have his release papers processed in any partic-
ular order and the thirty-nine-hour delay did not violate the plaintiff's
constitutional right to due process under the circumstances. 93
The Brass court stated that delays like those mentioned in Mc-
Laughlin are "inevitable."94 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that, just as McLaughlin held that the Fourth Amendment does
not compel an immediate determination of probable cause, the Four-
teenth Amendment similarly permits a reasonable postponement of a
prisoner's release while the county copes with the everyday problem
of out-processing a large number of prisoners.95
The Brass court further analyzed the McLaughlin standard,
stating:
It is unclear . .. whether the 48-hour period applied to probable
cause determinations is appropriate for effectuating the release of
prisoners whose basis for confinement has ended. One might con-
clude that when a court orders a prisoner released-or when, for
who may be busy processing other suspects or securing the premises of an
arrest, and other practical realities.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56-57.
89 328 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2003).
90 Id. at 1201-02.
91 Id. at 1198.
92 Id. at 1201.
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example, a prisoner's sentence has been completed-the outer
bounds for releasing the prisoner should be less than 48 hours.9 6
This dicta in Brass supports the following proposition: if forty-eight
hours is the presumptive constitutional limit for someone to be held
before a judicial officer determines whether a basis for detention ex-
ists, then a person for whom a judicial officer already has concluded
that no basis for continued detention exists should be released within
forty-eight hours, if not less.
Recently, in Berry v. Baca,9 7 the Ninth Circuit commented on
Brass's discussion of the McLaughlin standard:
In Brass, the panel discussed McLaughlin and concluded that,
while the two contexts share the same concerns about the need for
flexibility in the face of inevitable administrative and logistical de-
lays, they may not share the same precise calculus....
We agree with Brass that there are reasons to question the ap-
plicability of the forty-eight hour rule in this context. Applying Mc-
Laughlin's stringent proof requirement to post-release detentions of
less than forty-eight hours would be difficult to reconcile with the
fact that, for the plaintiffs at issue here, there has been a judicial
determination that they are entitled to freedom from the criminal
justice system. Thus, the societal interest in the processes that result
in delay, while significant, may not be as weighty as in the probable
cause context.98
The Bery court then went on to declare that "[a] dopting the
forty-eight hour rule into the context of post-release detentions would
also directly conflict with at least one other circuit, which has found
no zone of presumptive reasonableness in this context."9 9 The Berry
court was referring to the Seventh Circuit's seminal overdetention de-
cision, Leiwis v. O'Grady.10 0
96 Id.
97 379 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2004).
98 Id. at 771-72.
99 Id. at 772.
100 853 F.2d 1366 (7th Cir. 1988). In Lewis, the Seventh Circuit considered the
reasonableness of an eleven-hour overdetention:
We recognize that the administrative tasks incident to a release of a pris-
oner from custody may require some time to accomplish-in this case per-
haps a number of hours. Reasonable time must be allowed for such matters
as transportation, identity verification, and processing. It is virtually impossi-
ble to establish an absolute minimum time to meet all potential circum-
stances which might exist.
Id. at 1370. It should be noted that the Seventh Circuit decided Lewis three years
before the Supreme Court handed down the McLaughlin standard.
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In Berry, the Ninth Circuit relied on Brass and Lewis together to
support its conclusion that there is no basis for a bright-line rule:
"Like Brass and Lewis, we decline to determine a number of hours that
is presumptively reasonable for post-release over-detentions."'' This
result, as the Berry court intended, is good for individual claimants
because they are not held to a higher standard of proof if their
overdetentions lasted less than two days. Therefore, it is more likely
that their claims will not be dismissed at the summary judgment stage.
On the other hand, if courts persist in leaving these reasonableness
determinations to juries, there will never be a clear standard for
policymakers because each decision will solely depend on a fact-spe-
cific inquiry.
B. The Need for a Definitive Time Limit
Continued lack of clarity in this context is detrimental to systemic
reform. The McLaughlin Court "hesitate[d] to announce that the
Constitution compels a specific time limit" for post-arrest probable
cause determinations, but ultimately concluded that it was more "im-
portant to provide some degree of certainty so that States and coun-
ties may establish procedures with confidence that they fall within
constitutional bounds."10 2 Providing guidance for states and counties
is similarly important in the context of administrative overdetentions.
A spokesperson for the Cook County Sheriff correctly stated that
"jails have a 'reasonable' time frame to process detainees once they're
ordered released," but he made a point to explain that "[t]here's no
specifically prescribed time frame." 10 3 The prevalence of this mindset
allows officials overseeing facilities where inmates are overdetained
anywhere from a few hours to a few days to avoid responsibility. For
example, the Fulton County Attorney defended the practices at the
local jail saying: "The law allows a reasonable amount of time to pro-
cess people and get them out. And our position is that is what was
happening. The jail, at all times, has been constitutionally oper-
ated."'1 4 This statement causes one to query whether the current le-
gal standard is a normatively good one if persons entitled to release
remain in jail for days on end.
Another reason why there is a need for a clear rule for adminis-
trative overdetention is that people caught in such a situation are
101 379 F.3d at 772-73.
102 County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991).
103 Olmstead, supra note 7.
104 Cook, supra note 2.
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often indigent.10 5 If a person has the means to hire an attorney, that
attorney will make sure that his or her client is not kept in jail any
longer than absolutely necessary.10 6 However, if an economically dis-
advantaged person is not released on schedule, that person probably
will not have an attorney fighting for his or her individual liberty inter-
ests. If this scenario holds true, then no one can know the full extent
of the overdetention crisis because there are not enough advocates to
bring the problem to light.
Part II demonstrated how the current legal standard governing
administrative overdetention creates confusion just as the Gerstein
"promptness" standard created confusion for the required timing of
probable cause determinations. McLaughlin attempted to resolve the
uncertainty surrounding probable cause determinations, but the
Court has yet to establish a bright-line rule for administrative
overdetentions. Part III explores a possible solution to the problem-
a presumptive constitutional time limit.
III. PROPOSAL FOR A TWENTY-FOUR-HOUR PRESUMPTIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL TIME LIMIT
A. Burden-Shifing Framework
For reasons analogous to the ones articulated in McLaughlin, a
presumptive constitutional time limit should be established for the ad-
ministrative overdetention of inmates entitled to release. 10 7 A bur-
den-shifting framework, similar to the McLaughlin standard but with a
presumptive constitutional time limit of twenty-four hours, would
105 See, e.g., Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969). In Whirl, the plaintiff was
overdetained by more than nine months. Id. at 785. The indictments against Whirl
were dismissed but "[f]or some reason never adequately explained, the list of dismis-
sals was not processed, and Whirl's freedom was lost in a shuffle of papers. Being too
poor to raise bail, he was forced to remain in the courthhouse lockup." Id. at 786.
For a discussion of how pretrial confinement inordinately affects the poor, see RON-
ALD GOLDFARB, RANSOM: A CRITIQUE OF THE AMERICAN BAIL SYSTEM 32-42 (1965).
106 See, e.g., Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 1998). In Armstrong,
the plaintiff was held on a body attachment warrant for fifty-seven days because of a
record-keeping error. Id. at 567. Armstrong had no friends or relatives in town and
his domestic relations attorney did not accept collect calls. Id. at 568. Armstrong's
boss, who needed Armstrong back at work, eventually hired an attorney, who quickly
achieved Armstrong's release. Id. Armstrong is a classic example of how the system is
stacked against someone without an attorney.
107 While it seems that legislation could similarly accomplish the desired ends of
effectuating inmate releases within a reasonable amount of time, nevertheless one can
assume the legitimacy of establishing a constitutional time limit in the context of
overdetention because of the precedent that McLaughlin established in the analogous
situation of pretrial detention. See supra text accompanying note 102.
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serve the interests of public safety and individual liberty. If local au-
thorities meet the presumptive constitutional time limit by establish-
ing policies that successfully out-process inmates within twenty-four
hours, they will be immune from systemic challenges. Under this
framework, an inmate wishing to challenge a delay of less than twenty-
four hours would have to prove why the delay was unreasonable under
the particular circumstances. Conversely, if the delay was more than
twenty-four hours from the time the release order was entered, sur-
passing the presumptive constitutional time limit, the burden would
shift to jail administrators to prove why the delay was reasonable
under the circumstances.
As with the McLaughlin standard, 0 8 usual administrative delays
due to overcrowded facilities and a general lack of resources would
not be satisfactory excuses for exceeding the presumptive constitu-
tional time limit. Ironically, some administrators have blamed the Mc-
Laughlin requirements for an increased workload contributing to
delays in out-processing inmates. 10 9 Of course the Court would not
have intended the requirements for post-arrest probable cause hear-
ings to justify overdetention of inmates entitled to release when the
same liberty and public safety interests are at stake in both cases."l 0
Therefore, such considerations would not suffice as excuses for re-
lease delays of more than twenty-four hours.
Several jail administrators have also explained that much of the
time spent processing an inmate's release is consumed by a check for
outstanding criminal charges." ' I The amount of time it takes to run a
check for wants and holds should not extend the outer limit for
overdetention beyond twenty-four hours any more than complying
with the McLaughlin requirements should. As one district court ex-
plained, "there is no reason why a check for wants and holds needs to
occur after a person is [ordered] released" because such "checks can
occur at anytime between the original arrest and the case's ultimate
disposition."' 12
108 See supra note 74.
109 See Pollak, supra note 23.
110 Some would say that, although the same interests are implicated, once there
has been a judicial determination that a person is entitled to release the calculus is
somewhat different-the scale tips in favor of individual liberty interests because the
public safety concerns are less weighty than in the case of a warrantless arrest. See
supra text accompanying note 98.
111 See supra Part L.A and text accompanying note 31.
112 Fowler v. Block, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1279 (C.D. Cal. 1998), rev'd on other
grounds, 185 F.3d 866 (9th Cir. 1999). The district court based its conclusion on the
following: "It is usually no surprise to the courtroom deputies, or those responsible
for a criminal defendant's custody between the courtroom and the holding cell, that a
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Jail administrators would not be excused from the twenty-four-
hour limit simply because there was a backlog in data processing. If
the check takes more than twenty-four hours to complete, then jail
officials must initiate the process sometime before the inmate is or-
dered released. Since jail administrators are expected to know the
state of operations for the facility under their supervision, including
population and logistical factors necessary to effectuate releases, they
would have to prove the existence of a bona fide emergency or other
extraordinary circumstance to justify a delay in release of more than
twenty-four hours.
A twenty-four-hour presumptive constitutional time limit in cases
of overdetention would act like a type of heightened pleading require-
ment, allowing more cases to be resolved before trial. It would be
clear from the face of the plaintiffs complaint and the defendant's
responsive pleading whether any extraordinary circumstances existed
that would trump the twenty-four-hour presumption. Without evi-
dence of any special factors, it would be assumed that delays of less
than twenty-four hours were reasonable, whereas delays of more than
twenty-four hours were unreasonable. In this way, both parties could
make effective use of summary judgment.
Some criticize bright-line tests such as the one proposed as inflex-
ible. While flexible constitutional tests are useful because they give
deference to states to fashion procedures suited to local concerns, the
Supreme Court itself has declared that when it comes to constitutional
matters "flexibility has its limits."113 The most effective way to ensure
that states safeguard individual rights in the context of administrative
overdetentions is to establish a bright-line test.114 The proposed con-
stitutional time limit for out-processing inmates would provide gui-
dance to corrections administrators and government officials
responsible for overseeing facility operations. It would allow them to
create policies and implement procedures "with confidence that they
verdict is about to come down, that the court is considering some motion to dismiss,
or that a deal has been reached." Id.
113 County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 55 (1991).
114 Cf Alycia B. Olano, Note, Determination of Probable Cause for Warrantless Arrest: A
Casenote on County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 52 LA. L. REV. 1311, 1317 (1992)
("[T] he most efficient way to ensure the constitutionally demanded protection of in-
dividual liberty in the case of pretrial detention is with a bright line test regarding the
timing of the determination of probable cause."). Olano explained that, as flexibility
for constitutional guidelines increases, states may dilute individual rights by staying
close to the "floor" of rights established by a flexible constitutional standard. Id. See
generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175
(1989) (discussing the appropriateness of categorical rules versus balancing tests).
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fall within constitutional bounds."1 15 Clear constitutional boundaries
should result in an overall decrease in overdetention claims. For
claims that do arise, the presumptive constitutional time limit should
reduce the number of suits that actually go to trial.
The Supreme Court recognized the need for a bright-line rule in
cases of warrantless arrests and established a presumptive constitu-
tional time limit of forty-eight hours for probable cause hearings that
determine whether there is a basis for a suspect's detention. Then is it
just for inmates to be held longer than forty-eight hours once there
already has been ajudicial determination that no legal justification for
continued detention exists? If anything, the outer time limit should
be less than forty-eight hours.116
Since the same fundamental liberty interests and similar public
safety concerns are at stake in the context of warrantless arrests and
administrative overdetentions, it is useful to compare the McLaughlin
standard when choosing a specific constitutional time limit for admin-
istrative overdetention. Among the justices deciding McLaughlin,
there was a debate as to whether forty-eight hours was too long of a
delay for probable cause determinations. In dissent, Justice Marshall,
joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, found Gerstein's promptness
requirement to mean that a probable cause determination must be
made "immediately upon completion of the 'administrative steps inci-
dent to arrest."' 1 17 Justice Marshall declined to accept a bright-line
test, but based on the lower court's findings, it was clear that forty-
eight hours was not necessary to complete the administrative tasks in-
cident to a warrantless arrest.1 18
In his own dissent, Justice Scalia advocated a twenty-four-hour
rule. In his view, absent extraordinary circumstances, it is constitu-
tionally unreasonable for police to delay a determination of probable
cause after a warrantless arrest "for reasons unrelated to arrangement
of the probable cause determination or completion of the steps inci-
dent to arrest," or "beyond 24 hours after the arrest."1 1 9 Like the ma-
115 McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56.
116 See supra text accompanying note 96.
117 500 U.S. at 59 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103, 114 (1975)).
118 See id. The Ninth Circuit found that "no more than 36 hours were needed 'to
complete the administrative steps incident to arrest.'" Id. at 50 (majority opinion)
(quoting McLaughlin v. County of Riverside, 888 F.2d 1276, 1278 (9th Cir. 1989)). In
fact, the County acknowledged that close to ninety percent of all cases could be
processed in twenty-four hours or less. Id. at 68 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The forty-
eight hour time limit left room for states to combine probable cause determinations
with other preliminary hearings. Id. at 55-56 (majority opinion).
119 Id. at 70 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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jority, he would treat the time limit as a presumption: when the
twenty-four-hour time limit is surpassed, the burden shifts to the po-
lice to prove unforeseeable circumstances justifying the additional de-
lay. 120 For his chosen time limit, Justice Scalia relied heavily on the
fact that out of all the federal courts to examine the issue only one
concluded that twenty-four hours was inadequate to complete arrest
procedures, and all courts actually setting a time limit for probable
cause determinations selected twenty-four hours as the outer limit.' 2 1
Justice Scalia also noted that state and federal commissions and
judges, as well as commentators who had examined the question, all
supported a twenty-four-hour time limit.122
In balancing the practical realities of processing inmate releases,
it is settled that actual discharge may not be immediate.' 23 At the
same time, administrative overdetention of someone who is entitled to
release should be as short as practicably possible. In the McLaughlin
situation, most would agree that it is entirely feasible to conduct prob-
able cause determinations within twenty-four hours of a warrantless
arrest. 124 The administrative procedures incident to arrest-such as
fingerprinting and paperwork processing-mirror those involved in
the out-processing of inmates. 125 One major difference is that effectu-
ating the release of an inmate does not depend on the availability of a
magistrate. Not having to secure a judicial officer cuts in favor of a
lesser outer time limit for administrative overdetentions as compared
to post-arrest probable cause determinations. Considering the Mc-
Laughlin standard is forty-eight hours, twenty-four hours is a reasona-
ble compromise as a presumptive constitutional time limit for
administrative overdetention.
A bright-line test of twenty-four hours in the context of adminis-
trative overdetention is also justified because it does not offend the
demands of federalism discussed by Justice O'Connor in the majority
opinion of McLaughlin.126 Justice O'Connor criticized Justice Scalia's
120 Id.
121 Id. at 68-69.
122 Id. at 69-70; see, e.g., Wendy L. Brandes, Post-Arrest Detention and the Fourth
Amendment: Refining the Standard ofGerstein v. Pugh, 22 COLUM.J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 445
(1989); Jane H. Settle, Note, Williams v. Ward: Compromising the Constitutional Right to
Prompt Determination of Probable Cause upon Arrest, 74 MINN. L. REV. 196 (1989).
123 Lewis v. O'Grady, 853 F.2d 1366, 1370 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Reasonable time must
be allowed for such matters as transportation, identity verification, and processing.").
124 See supra note 118 and text accompanying notes 121-22.
125 See Lewis, 853 F.2d at 1369-70 (comparing the administrative delay between an
arrest and an appearance before a magistrate to an administrative delay in processing
an inmate entitled to release).
126 See 500 U.S. at 53 (majority opinion).
[VOL. 81:2
ADMINISTRATIVE OVERDETENTION OF INMATES
choice of a twenty-four-hour outer limit, noting that the situation in
McLaughlin did not compel such direct interference with local con-
trol. 127 Whether or not a twenty-four-hour rule for post-arrest proba-
ble cause determinations would result in direct interference with local
control, a twenty-four-hour time limit for administrative overdetention
does not disrespect local decisionmaking for two reasons: (1) a jailer
has the duty to effect an inmate's timely release, and (2) ajailer's acts
in discharging an inmate are "purely ministerial" in nature.128
"A jailer, unlike a policeman, acts at his leisure. He is not subject
to the stresses and split second decisions of an arresting of-
ficer. ... 129 Therefore, the discretion that ajailer may lawfully exer-
cise in effectuating an inmate's release is more limited in scope than
the discretion a police officer may exercise in effectuating an arrest.130
The discretion necessary for a jailer to effect an inmate's timely re-
lease is even less than that required for effective prison administration
in general-e.g., riot protocol or segregation policies. 13' For these
reasons, a window of twenty-four hours affords the proper deference
to federalism, especially considering reports of repeated administra-
tive overdetention occurring across the nation. 132
B. Costs and Benefits
The major costs of this twenty-four-hour proposal would be the
financial expenditures from the public treasury to update computer
technology and hire more corrections officers. By closely examining
policies and procedures already in place, particularly those which in-
volve inter-departmental communication and data processing, local
officials should be able to determine where backlogs occur. If officials
focus on fixing these problem areas, they may be able to remedy the
delays in release by simply tweaking current procedures and ap-
pointing as many new corrections officers as necessary to keep up with
the demands of the increasing inmate population. This could most
likely be done without a complete technological overhaul.
Although the initial investment of taxpayer dollars may be signifi-
cant, this is a slight burden compared with the harm caused to those
persons forced to remain in jail beyond their scheduled release
127 Id. at 57.
128 Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 792 (5th Cir. 1969).
129 Id.
130 See Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527, 535 (5th Cir. 1980).
131 Cf Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1109 (3d Cir. 1989) (contrasting the level
of deference that the judiciary affords prison officials to quell prison riots (high) with
the level that is afforded to provide medical care to inmates (less deference)).
132 See supra Part I.A.
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dates.1 33 In the context of warrantless arrests, the McLaughlin Court
recognized that the harm that would otherwise be caused to innocent
arrestees outweighed the costs of a bright-line rule for probable cause
determinations. Similarly, the harm to individual liberty interests in
the case of administrative overdetention outweighs the costs of estab-
lishing a clear constitutional standard. Furthermore, as the Ninth Cir-
cuit noted, "the administrative burden of accelerating the release
process . . . does not seem as weighty as the burden of establishing
probable cause under a tight timeline."1 3 4 If the Court felt compelled
to hand down a bright-line test in McLaughlin, a similar standard is
surely justified in this context.
Implementing policies and procedures that will satisfy the twenty-
four-hour time limit may be difficult in the beginning, but there will
be several lasting benefits. First, local officials will be assured that they
are in compliance with constitutional requirements by simply meeting
the clearly articulated standard. This will give peace of mind to cor-
rections facility administrators and local officials open to liability. Sec-
ond, officials will be held accountable for noncompliance under the
twenty-four-hour time limit. They will not be able to avoid liability for
noncompliance under a qualified immunity defense because the law
will now be "clearly established." 13 5 Third, the bright-line rule will re-
duce the overall number of claims against jail administrators and local
governments, as well as decrease the percentage of suits that actually
go to trial. Less litigation means less taxpayer money spent, which
may offset any expenditures necessary to come into compliance with
the proposed rule in the first place.136 Less litigation also allows local
governments to focus their attention on more pressing issues of gen-
eral concern while permitting local officials to concentrate on fulfil-
ling the duties of their office. Finally, and most importantly, persons
entitled to release will be set free as soon as practicably possible.
CONCLUSION
There are many popular misconceptions about the nation's jails
and prisons. Some believe that inmates just watch television and exer-
cise all day. Some would even endeavor to say that going to jail in the
133 See supra Part I.B (discussing the consequences of overdetention).
134 Berry v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764, 772 (9th Cir. 2004).
135 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 500, 518 (1982) ("[G]overnment officials per-
forming discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known." (emphasis added)).
136 See supra text accompanying note 6 (discussing a $27 million class action
settlement).
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United States is hardly punishment at all. One look at several recent
Department of Justice investigations will quickly dispel these myths.
The Civil Rights Division continually uncovers disturbing conditions
in correctional facilities and detention centers across the nation, in-
cluding inadequacies in fire safety, physical plant, inmate classification
and segregation, staffing and training, medical care, and mental
health care. 13 7 These deficiencies put inmates at risk of dangerously
poor sanitation, inter-inmate violence, and excessive use of force by
corrections officers.1 3
8
The incarcerated are a forgotten population. As a model of de-
mocracy, the United States proclaims that there is "liberty and justice
for all." For this to hold true, the nation must pay attention to those
easily forgotten and ensure that the fundamental constitutional rights
of every person are protected. As Winston Churchill explained, the
way a nation treats its accused and even the convicted criminal is
proof of that nation's living virtue.1 39 Unreasonable overdetention of
persons entitled to their freedom does not comport with the virtues
this nation proclaims. In order to properly defend individual rights,
the nation needs a clear legal standard regarding administrative
overdetention of inmates entitled to release. A presumptive constitu-
tional time limit of twenty-four hours will safeguard private liberty in-
terests as well as public safety concerns by giving guidance to
corrections facility administrators and policymakers.
137 See generally Special Litig. Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Investigative Findings:
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act Investigations, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/
split/findsettle.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2005).
138 See id.
139 See supra text accompanying note 1.
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